Gateway: sanitize WebSocket log headers (#15592)

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2026-02-13 11:11:54 -06:00
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parent b3b49bed80
commit d637a26350
2 changed files with 36 additions and 7 deletions
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Agents/Image tool: cap image-analysis completion `maxTokens` by model capability (`min(4096, model.maxTokens)`) to avoid over-limit provider failures while still preventing truncation. (#11770) Thanks @detecti1.
- Security/Canvas: serve A2UI assets via the shared safe-open path (`openFileWithinRoot`) to close traversal/TOCTOU gaps, with traversal and symlink regression coverage. (#10525) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/Gateway: breaking default-behavior change - canvas IP-based auth fallback now only accepts machine-scoped addresses (RFC1918, link-local, ULA IPv6, CGNAT); public-source IP matches now require bearer token auth. (#14661) Thanks @sumleo.
- Security/Gateway: sanitize and truncate untrusted WebSocket header values in pre-handshake close logs to reduce log-poisoning risk. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
- Security/WhatsApp: enforce `0o600` on `creds.json` and `creds.json.bak` on save/backup/restore paths to reduce credential file exposure. (#10529) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/Gateway + ACP: block high-risk tools (`sessions_spawn`, `sessions_send`, `gateway`, `whatsapp_login`) from HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides, and harden ACP permission selection to fail closed when tool identity/options are ambiguous while supporting `allow_always`/`reject_always`. (#15390) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
- Gateway/Tools Invoke: sanitize `/tools/invoke` execution failures while preserving `400` for tool input errors and returning `500` for unexpected runtime failures, with regression coverage and docs updates. (#13185) Thanks @davidrudduck.