Security/Browser: constrain trace and download output paths to OpenClaw temp roots (#15652)

* Browser/Security: constrain trace and download output paths to temp roots

* Changelog: remove advisory ID from pre-public security note

* Browser/Security: constrain trace and download output paths to temp roots

* Changelog: remove advisory ID from pre-public security note

* test(bluebubbles): align timeout status expectation to 408

* test(discord): remove unused race-condition counter in threading test

* test(bluebubbles): align timeout status expectation to 408
This commit is contained in:
Mariano
2026-02-13 19:24:33 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 08725270e2
commit 7f0489e473
10 changed files with 166 additions and 16 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Security/WhatsApp: enforce `0o600` on `creds.json` and `creds.json.bak` on save/backup/restore paths to reduce credential file exposure. (#10529) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- WhatsApp: preserve outbound document filenames for web-session document sends instead of always sending `"file"`. (#15594) Thanks @TsekaLuk.
- Security/Gateway + ACP: block high-risk tools (`sessions_spawn`, `sessions_send`, `gateway`, `whatsapp_login`) from HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides, and harden ACP permission selection to fail closed when tool identity/options are ambiguous while supporting `allow_always`/`reject_always`. (#15390) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
- Security/Browser: constrain `POST /trace/stop`, `POST /wait/download`, and `POST /download` output paths to OpenClaw temp roots and reject traversal/escape paths.
- Gateway/Tools Invoke: sanitize `/tools/invoke` execution failures while preserving `400` for tool input errors and returning `500` for unexpected runtime failures, with regression coverage and docs updates. (#13185) Thanks @davidrudduck.
- MS Teams: preserve parsed mention entities/text when appending OneDrive fallback file links, and accept broader real-world Teams mention ID formats (`29:...`, `8:orgid:...`) while still rejecting placeholder patterns. (#15436) Thanks @hyojin.
- Security/Audit: distinguish external webhooks (`hooks.enabled`) from internal hooks (`hooks.internal.enabled`) in attack-surface summaries to avoid false exposure signals when only internal hooks are enabled. (#13474) Thanks @mcaxtr.