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fix(security): enforce sandbox bridge auth

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Peter Steinberger
2026-02-14 13:17:41 +01:00
parent 4711a943e3
commit 6dd6bce997
8 changed files with 108 additions and 5 deletions
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CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Security/Link understanding: block loopback/internal host patterns and private/mapped IPv6 addresses in extracted URL handling to close SSRF bypasses in link CLI flows. (#15604) Thanks @AI-Reviewer-QS.
- Security/Browser: constrain `POST /trace/stop`, `POST /wait/download`, and `POST /download` output paths to OpenClaw temp roots and reject traversal/escape paths.
- Security/Browser: require auth for the sandbox browser bridge server (protects `/profiles`, `/tabs`, CDP URLs, and other control endpoints). Thanks @jackhax.
- Security: bind local helper servers to loopback and fail closed on non-loopback OAuth callback hosts (reduces localhost/LAN attack surface).
- Security/Canvas: serve A2UI assets via the shared safe-open path (`openFileWithinRoot`) to close traversal/TOCTOU gaps, with traversal and symlink regression coverage. (#10525) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/WhatsApp: enforce `0o600` on `creds.json` and `creds.json.bak` on save/backup/restore paths to reduce credential file exposure. (#10529) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/Gateway: sanitize and truncate untrusted WebSocket header values in pre-handshake close logs to reduce log-poisoning risk. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.