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fix(security): harden archive extraction (#16203)

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* fix(browser): confine upload paths for file chooser

* fix(browser): sanitize suggested download filenames

* chore(lint): avoid control regex in download sanitizer

* test(browser): cover absolute escape paths

* docs(browser): update upload example path

* refactor(browser): centralize upload path confinement

* fix(infra): harden tmp dir selection

* fix(security): harden archive extraction

* fix(infra): harden tar extraction filter
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-14 14:42:08 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 9a134c8a10
commit 3aa94afcfd
19 changed files with 1179 additions and 100 deletions
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CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
### Fixes
- Security/Skills: harden archive extraction for download-installed skills to prevent path traversal outside the target directory. Thanks @markmusson.
- Security/Signal: harden signal-cli archive extraction during install to prevent path traversal outside the install root.
- Security/Hooks: restrict hook transform modules to `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms` (prevents path traversal/escape module loads via config). Config note: `hooks.transformsDir` must now be within that directory. Thanks @akhmittra.
- Security/Hooks: ignore hook package manifest entries that point outside the package directory (prevents out-of-tree handler loads during hook discovery).
- Ollama/Agents: avoid forcing `<final>` tag enforcement for Ollama models, which could suppress all output as `(no output)`. (#16191) Thanks @Glucksberg.
@@ -85,6 +87,8 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Security/Gateway: breaking default-behavior change - canvas IP-based auth fallback now only accepts machine-scoped addresses (RFC1918, link-local, ULA IPv6, CGNAT); public-source IP matches now require bearer token auth. (#14661) Thanks @sumleo.
- Security/Link understanding: block loopback/internal host patterns and private/mapped IPv6 addresses in extracted URL handling to close SSRF bypasses in link CLI flows. (#15604) Thanks @AI-Reviewer-QS.
- Security/Browser: constrain `POST /trace/stop`, `POST /wait/download`, and `POST /download` output paths to OpenClaw temp roots and reject traversal/escape paths.
- Security/Browser: sanitize download `suggestedFilename` to keep implicit `wait/download` paths within the downloads root. Thanks @1seal.
- Security/Browser: confine `POST /hooks/file-chooser` upload paths to an OpenClaw temp uploads root and reject traversal/escape paths. Thanks @1seal.
- Security/Browser: require auth for the sandbox browser bridge server (protects `/profiles`, `/tabs`, CDP URLs, and other control endpoints). Thanks @jackhax.
- Security: bind local helper servers to loopback and fail closed on non-loopback OAuth callback hosts (reduces localhost/LAN attack surface).
- Security/Canvas: serve A2UI assets via the shared safe-open path (`openFileWithinRoot`) to close traversal/TOCTOU gaps, with traversal and symlink regression coverage. (#10525) Thanks @abdelsfane.