fix(security): restrict canvas IP-based auth to private networks (#14661)

Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: 9e4e1aca4a89fc4df572681a1146af31b1a3cd50
Co-authored-by: sumleo <29517764+sumleo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: steipete <58493+steipete@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @steipete
This commit is contained in:
Yi Liu
2026-02-14 00:13:31 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent e665d77917
commit 14fc742000
5 changed files with 133 additions and 12 deletions
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
### Fixes
- Security/Canvas: serve A2UI assets via the shared safe-open path (`openFileWithinRoot`) to close traversal/TOCTOU gaps, with traversal and symlink regression coverage. (#10525) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/Gateway: breaking default-behavior change - canvas IP-based auth fallback now only accepts machine-scoped addresses (RFC1918, link-local, ULA IPv6, CGNAT); public-source IP matches now require bearer token auth. (#14661) Thanks @sumleo.
- Security/WhatsApp: enforce `0o600` on `creds.json` and `creds.json.bak` on save/backup/restore paths to reduce credential file exposure. (#10529) Thanks @abdelsfane.
- Security/Gateway + ACP: block high-risk tools (`sessions_spawn`, `sessions_send`, `gateway`, `whatsapp_login`) from HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides, and harden ACP permission selection to fail closed when tool identity/options are ambiguous while supporting `allow_always`/`reject_always`. (#15390) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
- Gateway/Tools Invoke: sanitize `/tools/invoke` execution failures while preserving `400` for tool input errors and returning `500` for unexpected runtime failures, with regression coverage and docs updates. (#13185) Thanks @davidrudduck.