---
summary: "Exec approvals, allowlists, and sandbox escape prompts"
read_when:
  - Configuring exec approvals or allowlists
  - Implementing exec approval UX in the macOS app
  - Reviewing sandbox escape prompts and implications
---

# Exec approvals

Exec approvals are the **companion app / node host guardrail** for letting a sandboxed agent run
commands on a real host (`gateway` or `node`). Think of it like a safety interlock:
commands are allowed only when policy + allowlist + (optional) user approval all agree.
Exec approvals are **in addition** to tool policy and elevated gating.

If the companion app UI is **not available**, any request that requires a prompt is
resolved by the **ask fallback** (default: deny).

## Where it applies

Exec approvals are enforced locally on the execution host:
- **gateway host** → `clawdbot` process on the gateway machine
- **node host** → node runner (macOS companion app or headless node host)

Planned macOS split:
- **node host service** forwards `system.run` to the **macOS app** over local IPC.
- **macOS app** enforces approvals + executes the command in UI context.

## Settings and storage

Approvals live in a local JSON file on the execution host:

`~/.clawdbot/exec-approvals.json`

Example schema:
```json
{
  "version": 1,
  "socket": {
    "path": "~/.clawdbot/exec-approvals.sock",
    "token": "base64url-token"
  },
  "defaults": {
    "security": "deny",
    "ask": "on-miss",
    "askFallback": "deny",
    "autoAllowSkills": false
  },
  "agents": {
    "main": {
      "security": "allowlist",
      "ask": "on-miss",
      "askFallback": "deny",
      "autoAllowSkills": true,
      "allowlist": [
        {
          "pattern": "~/Projects/**/bin/rg",
          "lastUsedAt": 1737150000000,
          "lastUsedCommand": "rg -n TODO",
          "lastResolvedPath": "/Users/user/Projects/.../bin/rg"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Policy knobs

### Security (`exec.security`)
- **deny**: block all host exec requests.
- **allowlist**: allow only allowlisted commands.
- **full**: allow everything (equivalent to elevated).

### Ask (`exec.ask`)
- **off**: never prompt.
- **on-miss**: prompt only when allowlist does not match.
- **always**: prompt on every command.

### Ask fallback (`askFallback`)
If a prompt is required but no UI is reachable, fallback decides:
- **deny**: block.
- **allowlist**: allow only if allowlist matches.
- **full**: allow.

## Allowlist (per agent)

Allowlists are **per agent**. If multiple agents exist, switch which agent you’re
editing in the macOS app. Patterns are **case-insensitive glob matches**.

Examples:
- `~/Projects/**/bin/bird`
- `~/.local/bin/*`
- `/opt/homebrew/bin/rg`

Each allowlist entry tracks:
- **last used** timestamp
- **last used command**
- **last resolved path**

## Auto-allow skill CLIs

When **Auto-allow skill CLIs** is enabled, executables referenced by known skills
are treated as allowlisted on nodes (macOS node or headless node host). This uses the Bridge RPC to ask the
gateway for the skill bin list. Disable this if you want strict manual allowlists.

## Control UI editing

Use the **Control UI → Nodes → Exec approvals** card to edit defaults, per‑agent
overrides, and allowlists. Pick a scope (Defaults or an agent), tweak the policy,
add/remove allowlist patterns, then **Save**. The UI shows **last used** metadata
per pattern so you can keep the list tidy.

The target selector chooses **Gateway** (local approvals) or a **Node**. Nodes
must advertise `system.execApprovals.get/set` (macOS app or headless node host).
If a node does not advertise exec approvals yet, edit its local
`~/.clawdbot/exec-approvals.json` directly.

CLI: `clawdbot approvals` supports gateway or node editing (see [Approvals CLI](/cli/approvals)).

## Approval flow

When a prompt is required, the gateway broadcasts `exec.approval.requested` to operator clients.
The Control UI and macOS app resolve it via `exec.approval.resolve`, then the gateway forwards the
approved request to the node host.

The confirmation dialog includes:
- command + args
- cwd
- agent id
- resolved executable path
- host + policy metadata

Actions:
- **Allow once** → run now
- **Always allow** → add to allowlist + run
- **Deny** → block

### macOS IPC flow (planned)
```
Gateway -> Bridge -> Node Service (TS)
                    |  IPC (UDS + token + HMAC + TTL)
                    v
                Mac App (UI + approvals + system.run)
```

Security notes:
- Unix socket mode `0600`, token stored in `exec-approvals.json`.
- Same-UID peer check.
- Challenge/response (nonce + HMAC token + request hash) + short TTL.

## System events

Exec lifecycle is surfaced as system messages:
- `exec.started`
- `exec.finished`
- `exec.denied`

These are posted to the agent’s session after the node reports the event.

## Implications

- **full** is powerful; prefer allowlists when possible.
- **ask** keeps you in the loop while still allowing fast approvals.
- Per-agent allowlists prevent one agent’s approvals from leaking into others.

Related:
- [Exec tool](/tools/exec)
- [Elevated mode](/tools/elevated)
- [Skills](/tools/skills)
