diff --git a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts
index b10ece77..ff39a21f 100644
--- a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts
+++ b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Tool } from '@langchain/core/tools'
 import { ICommonObject, IDatabaseEntity, INode, INodeData, INodeOptionsValue, INodeParams } from '../../../../src/Interface'
-import { MCPToolkit } from '../core'
+import { MCPToolkit, validateMCPServerSecurity } from '../core'
 import { getVars, prepareSandboxVars } from '../../../../src/utils'
 import { DataSource } from 'typeorm'
 import hash from 'object-hash'
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ class Custom_MCP implements INode {
                 serverParams = JSON.parse(serverParamsString)
             }
 
+            if (process.env.CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK === 'true') {
+                validateMCPServerSecurity(serverParams)
+            }
+
             // Compatible with stdio and SSE
             let toolkit: MCPToolkit
             if (serverParams?.command === undefined) {
diff --git a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/Supergateway/SupergatewayMCP.ts b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/Supergateway/SupergatewayMCP.ts
index b8e1d628..347a3577 100644
--- a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/Supergateway/SupergatewayMCP.ts
+++ b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/Supergateway/SupergatewayMCP.ts
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { Tool } from '@langchain/core/tools'
 import { ICommonObject, INode, INodeData, INodeOptionsValue, INodeParams } from '../../../../src/Interface'
 import { getNodeModulesPackagePath } from '../../../../src/utils'
-import { MCPToolkit } from '../core'
+import { MCPToolkit, validateMCPServerSecurity } from '../core'
 
 class Supergateway_MCP implements INode {
     label: string
@@ -90,21 +90,28 @@ class Supergateway_MCP implements INode {
         const _args = nodeData.inputs?.arguments as string
         const packagePath = getNodeModulesPackagePath('supergateway/dist/index.js')
 
+        const processedArgs = _args
+            .trim()
+            .split(/\s+/)
+            .map((arg) => {
+                // Remove surrounding double or single quotes if they exist
+                if ((arg.startsWith('"') && arg.endsWith('"')) || (arg.startsWith("'") && arg.endsWith("'"))) {
+                    return arg.slice(1, -1)
+                }
+                return arg
+            })
+
         const serverParams = {
             command: 'node',
-            args: [
-                packagePath,
-                ..._args
-                    .trim()
-                    .split(/\s+/)
-                    .map((arg) => {
-                        // Remove surrounding double or single quotes if they exist
-                        if ((arg.startsWith('"') && arg.endsWith('"')) || (arg.startsWith("'") && arg.endsWith("'"))) {
-                            return arg.slice(1, -1)
-                        }
-                        return arg
-                    })
-            ]
+            args: [packagePath, ...processedArgs]
+        }
+
+        if (process.env.CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK === 'true') {
+            try {
+                validateMCPServerSecurity(serverParams)
+            } catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`Security validation failed: ${error.message}`)
+            }
         }
 
         const toolkit = new MCPToolkit(serverParams, 'stdio')
diff --git a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts
index 6c6f49f2..be9e65f5 100644
--- a/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts
+++ b/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts
@@ -173,3 +173,400 @@ function createSchemaModel(
 
     return z.object(schemaProperties)
 }
+
+/**
+ * TODO: To be removed and only allow Remote MCP for Cloud
+ * Validates MCP server configuration to prevent execution of dangerous commands
+ */
+export function validateMCPServerSecurity(serverParams: any): void {
+    // Comprehensive list of dangerous commands that could compromise system security
+    const dangerousCommands = [
+        // Shell interpreters and command processors
+        'sh',
+        'bash',
+        'zsh',
+        'fish',
+        'csh',
+        'tcsh',
+        'ksh',
+        'ash',
+        'dash',
+        'cmd',
+        'command',
+        'powershell',
+        'pwsh',
+        'cmd.exe',
+        'powershell.exe',
+        'wsl',
+        'wsl.exe',
+        'ubuntu',
+        'debian',
+
+        // File operations that could read/write sensitive files
+        'cat',
+        'more',
+        'less',
+        'head',
+        'tail',
+        'tee',
+        'cp',
+        'mv',
+        'rm',
+        'del',
+        'copy',
+        'move',
+        'type',
+        'ren',
+        'rename',
+        'ln',
+        'link',
+        'unlink',
+        'touch',
+        'mkdir',
+        'rmdir',
+        'rd',
+        'md',
+        'makedir',
+
+        // Directory operations and file system navigation
+        'ls',
+        'dir',
+        'pwd',
+        'cd',
+        'find',
+        'locate',
+        'tree',
+        'du',
+        'df',
+        'pushd',
+        'popd',
+        'dirs',
+        'whereis',
+        'which',
+        'where',
+        'stat',
+
+        // Network operations that could exfiltrate data or download malicious content
+        'curl',
+        'wget',
+        'nc',
+        'netcat',
+        'ping',
+        'nslookup',
+        'dig',
+        'host',
+        'telnet',
+        'ssh',
+        'scp',
+        'rsync',
+        'ftp',
+        'sftp',
+        'icat',
+        'socat',
+
+        // System operations and process management
+        'ps',
+        'top',
+        'htop',
+        'kill',
+        'killall',
+        'pkill',
+        'pgrep',
+        'jobs',
+        'systemctl',
+        'service',
+        'chkconfig',
+        'update-rc.d',
+        'systemd',
+        'crontab',
+        'at',
+        'batch',
+        'nohup',
+        'screen',
+        'tmux',
+
+        // Archive operations that could be used for data exfiltration
+        'tar',
+        'zip',
+        'unzip',
+        'gzip',
+        'gunzip',
+        'bzip2',
+        'bunzip2',
+        'xz',
+        'unxz',
+        '7z',
+        'rar',
+        'unrar',
+        'compress',
+        'uncompress',
+        'cpio',
+        'ar',
+
+        // Text processing tools that could read sensitive files
+        'grep',
+        'awk',
+        'sed',
+        'sort',
+        'uniq',
+        'cut',
+        'tr',
+        'wc',
+        'diff',
+        'patch',
+        'strings',
+        'hexdump',
+        'od',
+        'xxd',
+        'base64',
+        'base32',
+
+        // File editors that could modify system files
+        'vi',
+        'vim',
+        'nano',
+        'emacs',
+        'gedit',
+        'notepad',
+        'notepad.exe',
+        'pico',
+        'joe',
+        'micro',
+        'code',
+        'subl',
+        'atom',
+
+        // Process execution and evaluation commands
+        'exec',
+        'eval',
+        'system',
+        'spawn',
+        'fork',
+        'clone',
+        'source',
+        'sudo',
+        'su',
+        'runuser',
+        'doas',
+        'pfexec',
+
+        // Package managers that could install malicious software
+        'npm',
+        'yarn',
+        'pnpm',
+        'pip',
+        'pip3',
+        'apt',
+        'apt-get',
+        'yum',
+        'dnf',
+        'pacman',
+        'brew',
+        'choco',
+        'winget',
+        'scoop',
+        'snap',
+        'flatpak',
+
+        // Compilers and interpreters that could execute arbitrary code
+        'python',
+        'python3',
+        'nodejs',
+        'java',
+        'javac',
+        'gcc',
+        'g++',
+        'clang',
+        'clang++',
+        'ruby',
+        'perl',
+        'php',
+        'go',
+        'rust',
+        'cargo',
+        'dotnet',
+        'mono',
+        'scala',
+        'kotlin',
+        'swift',
+
+        // Database clients that could access sensitive data
+        'mysql',
+        'psql',
+        'mongo',
+        'mongosh',
+        'redis-cli',
+        'sqlite3',
+        'sqlcmd',
+        'isql',
+        'osql',
+        'bcp',
+
+        // Development and deployment tools
+        'git',
+        'docker',
+        'podman',
+        'kubectl',
+        'helm',
+        'terraform',
+        'ansible',
+        'vagrant',
+        'chef',
+        'puppet',
+        'saltstack',
+        'make',
+        'cmake',
+
+        // System information and configuration tools
+        'uname',
+        'whoami',
+        'id',
+        'groups',
+        'env',
+        'set',
+        'printenv',
+        'export',
+        'mount',
+        'umount',
+        'lsblk',
+        'fdisk',
+        'parted',
+        'lsmod',
+        'modprobe',
+
+        // File permissions and ownership commands
+        'chmod',
+        'chown',
+        'chgrp',
+        'umask',
+        'setfacl',
+        'getfacl',
+        'lsattr',
+        'chattr',
+
+        // Network configuration and monitoring
+        'ifconfig',
+        'ip',
+        'route',
+        'netstat',
+        'ss',
+        'lsof',
+        'tcpdump',
+        'wireshark',
+        'iptables',
+        'ufw',
+        'firewall-cmd',
+
+        // Boot and system control
+        'init',
+        'telinit',
+        'shutdown',
+        'reboot',
+        'halt',
+        'poweroff',
+
+        // Hardware and kernel interaction
+        'dmesg',
+        'lspci',
+        'lsusb',
+        'dmidecode',
+        'hdparm',
+        'smartctl'
+    ]
+
+    /**
+     * Checks a string for dangerous commands and patterns
+     * @param str - The string to check
+     * @param context - Context information for better error messages
+     */
+    function checkString(str: string, context: string = ''): void {
+        if (typeof str !== 'string') return
+
+        const lowerStr = str.toLowerCase().trim()
+        const contextPrefix = context ? `${context}: ` : ''
+
+        for (const cmd of dangerousCommands) {
+            const cmdLower = cmd.toLowerCase()
+            // Escape special regex characters in command name
+            const escapedCmd = cmdLower.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')
+
+            if (
+                lowerStr === cmdLower || // 1. Exact match: "cat" === "cat"
+                lowerStr.startsWith(cmdLower + ' ') || // 2. Command with space args: "cat /etc/passwd"
+                lowerStr.startsWith(cmdLower + '\t') || // 3. Command with tab args: "cat\t/etc/passwd"
+                lowerStr.endsWith('/' + cmdLower) || // 4. Unix absolute path: "/bin/sh"
+                lowerStr.includes('\\' + cmdLower + '.exe') || // 5. Windows executable: "C:\\Windows\\cmd.exe"
+                lowerStr.includes('/' + cmdLower + ' ') || // 6. Unix path with args: "/bin/sh -c"
+                lowerStr.includes('\\' + cmdLower + ' ') || // 7. Windows path with args: "C:\\bin\\sh.exe -c"
+                new RegExp(`\\b${escapedCmd}\\b`).test(lowerStr)
+            ) {
+                // 8. Word boundary match: catches embedded commands
+                throw new Error(`${contextPrefix}Dangerous command detected: "${cmd}" in "${str}"`)
+            }
+        }
+
+        // 2. Check for null bytes (binary content or encoding attacks)
+        if (str.includes('\0')) {
+            throw new Error(`${contextPrefix}Null byte detected in string: "${str}"`)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Recursively validates an object for dangerous content
+     * This function traverses the entire object tree to ensure no malicious content is hidden
+     * @param obj - The object to validate (can be string, array, object, or primitive)
+     * @param path - The current path in the object (for error reporting and debugging)
+     */
+    function validateObject(obj: any, path: string = ''): void {
+        // Skip null/undefined values
+        if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return
+
+        if (typeof obj === 'string') {
+            // Validate string content for dangerous commands and patterns
+            checkString(obj, path)
+        } else if (Array.isArray(obj)) {
+            // Recursively validate each array element
+            obj.forEach((item, index) => {
+                validateObject(item, `${path}[${index}]`)
+            })
+        } else if (typeof obj === 'object') {
+            // Recursively validate each object property
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj)) {
+                const currentPath = path ? `${path}.${key}` : key
+                // Validate only the property value
+                validateObject(value, currentPath)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    validateObject(serverParams, 'serverParams')
+
+    if (serverParams.command) {
+        const cmd = serverParams.command.toLowerCase()
+        if (cmd.includes('sh') || cmd.includes('cmd') || cmd.includes('powershell') || cmd.includes('eval')) {
+            throw new Error(`Command field contains dangerous interpreter: "${serverParams.command}"`)
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (serverParams.env) {
+        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(serverParams.env)) {
+            if (typeof value === 'string' && (value.includes('$(') || value.includes('`'))) {
+                throw new Error(`Environment variable "${key}" contains command substitution: "${value}"`)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (serverParams.cwd) {
+        checkString(serverParams.cwd, 'cwd')
+        const cwd = serverParams.cwd.toLowerCase()
+        if (
+            cwd.startsWith('/bin') ||
+            cwd.startsWith('/sbin') ||
+            cwd.startsWith('/etc') ||
+            cwd.includes('system32') ||
+            cwd.includes('program files')
+        ) {
+            throw new Error(`Working directory points to sensitive system location: "${serverParams.cwd}"`)
+        }
+    }
+}